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International trade in wildlife and endangered species is an extremely lucrative business, 
bringing in an estimated five billion US dollars annually.1 This makes it one of the 
world’s largest industries.2 Nearly one third of this trade is illegal.3 Millions of animals 
suffer and die each year at the hands of man, often due to human greed and vanity.4 This 
international market for animals has led to drastic declines in the populations of many 
species, including such exotic animals as the rhino, leopard, tiger, and the African 
elephant.5 The African elephant’s plight has arguably been the most popular. Due to trade 
in its ivory, African elephant populations declined so dramatically that experts claimed 
the elephant would be extinct by 2010.6 This paper examines the steps taken by 
international law to protect the African elephant, and specifically looks at the two 
strategies adopted by the African countries to ensure this protection. 
 
1.2. The African Elephant 
In 1979, 1.5 million elephants populated the African countryside.7 A decade later this 
number dropped to less than 600 000.8 This decline was mainly due to the ivory trade 
which will be discussed below.9 Today elephants roam over 3.1 million square miles, 
                                                 
1 M Hara ‘International Trade in Ivory from the African Elephant: Issues surrounding the CITES Ban and 
SAWCM’s chances of overturning it’ 1997 South African Perspectives Centre for South African Studies 1 
at 1 
2 Rea ‘The Fortune Directory of the largest U.S. Industrial Corporation’ 1983 Fortune at 228 
3 Porter and Brown ‘The trade in ivory from African elephants’ Environmental Global Politics Colorado 
HarperCollins 
4 B Padgett ‘The African Elephant, Africa, and CITES: The Next Step’ (1994-1995) 2 Ind. J. Global Legal 
Stud. 529 at 529 
5 Ibid 
6 I and O Douglas-Hamilton ‘Battle for the Elephants’ 1992 Transworld Publishers Ltd London 
7 A Thornton and D Currey ‘To Save an Elephant: The undercover investigation into the Illegal Ivory 
Trade’ 1991 Transworld Publishers Ltd London 
8 Douglas-Hamilton (note 6) 
9 See Chapter 1.3. 
 5 
through 31 countries.10 The IUCN estimated that, in 1998 there were between 300 000 
and 480 000 elephants alive on the continent.11 
 
The world’s largest land mammal, the elephant can live up to seventy years with a life 
cycle similar to that of humans.12 They are highly intelligent and social and live in 
matriarchal groups.13 Elephants communicate by emitting low frequency calls that are 
inaudible to the human ear.14 Elephants are quite affectionate, often touching each other 
with their trunks, leaning on or rubbing each other with their bodies.15 After being apart 
for a while, they greet each other by intertwining trunks, clashing trunks and flapping 
ears, exhibiting great excitement even if the separation has lasted for only a few days.16 
They help other members of the group that are threatened or disabled, and also become 
quite depressed when members of the group die.17 They tend to touch the carcass lightly 
with their trunks and feet, and cover it with loose dirt and branches.18 
 
Humans are the only natural enemy of elephants.19 Elephant populations have declined 
due to anthropogenic actions. Human populations, however, continue to increase 
exponentially, especially in Africa.20 This increased population of humans creates a 
struggle for space and resources, and thus causes tension as humans settle in the 
elephants’ natural habitat. In some places, the elephant is viewed as a magnificent 
creature, in others it is seen as a pest which ruins crops and causes danger to human life.21 
                                                 
10 S Hitch ‘Losing the elephant wars: CITES and the “Ivory Ban”’ (1999) 27 Ga. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 167 
at 168 
11 M Del Baglivo ‘CITES at crossroads: New Ivory Sales and Sleeping Giants’ (2002) 14 Fordham Envtl. 
L. J. 279 at 281 
12 D Harland ‘Killing Game: International Law and the African Elephant’ 1994 Praeger 
13 M J Glennon ‘Has International Law failed the elephant?’ (1990) 84 Am. J. Int’l. L. 1 at 1 
14 Ibid (Glennon reports that on the same day culling of elephants began in the Hwange National Park in 
Zimbabwe, elephants located some 90 miles away began to flee in the opposite corner of the reserve) 




19 T McBride ‘The Dangers of Liberal Neo-Colonialism and the CITES Treaty’ (1998-1999) 19 B. C. Third 
World L. J. 733 at 733 
20 See World Populations Index and Growth  
http://geography.about.com/od/obtainpopulationdata/a/worldpopulation.htm   
21 P F Storey ‘Development vs. Conservation: The Future of the African elephant’ (1993) 18 Wm. & Mary 
Journal of Environmental Law 375 at 377 
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In a continent largely plagued by civil unrest, corruption, poverty, and starvation, the 
preservation of the African elephant remains of little priority.22 The African elephant is 
among the many species that live and die on an Earth shared with a population of one 
specific species, humans, which have taken it up as their property and are reluctant to 
share unless paid to do so. It is humans alone, therefore, who will decide the fate of these 
remarkable creatures.23 
 
1.3. International Law and the Ivory Trade 
Ivory has been prized by humans for many generations.24 The main uses of ivory are 
making dagger handles in Yemen, hanko in Japan, piano keys and curios around the 
world, and aphrodisiac medicines in Asia.25 In the late 1970s the market for ivory reached 
massive proportions and resulted in heavy poaching of elephants.26 The formulation of 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Fauna and Flora (CITES) was due 
to the illegal killing of animals to feed trade like ivory. The Convention came into force 
in 1975.27 At this time the African elephant was placed on Appendix II which allows 
limited trade. The Appendix II listing was insufficient to protect the elephant from being 
overexploited. The demand for ivory steadily increased to the point where and estimated 
one thousand tons of ivory were exported from Africa every year.28  
 
In 1989 the market for ivory was estimated to have been worth U$50- 60 million 
annually, and ivory was worth U$140 a pound.29 As a result, poaching caused the 
elephant population to decline by two thirds between 1979 and 1989.30 In some African 
countries the elephant went extinct altogether.31 The Largest consumers of raw ivory 
                                                 
22 Hitch (Note 10) at 169  
23 McBride (Note 19) at 733 
24 Harland (Note 12) 
25 Glennon (Note 13) at 122 
26 Ibid 
27 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Fauna and Flora, March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 
I.L.M. 1085 (entered into force 1 July 1975) 
28 Hitch (Note10) at 172 
29 R Leakey ‘A perspective from Kenya: Elephants today and tomorrow’ 1993 Wildlife Conservation at 58 
30 Declined from and estimated 1.5 million in 1979 to less than 600 000 in 1989, see first paragraph (1.1. 
Background) 
31 Douglas-Hamilton (Note 6) 
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were Asian nations, with Japan importing more than any other country.32 In addition to 
the legal worldwide trade, some estimate that illegally obtained ivory comprised 90% of 
the world ivory trade.33 At the peak of trading, elephants were being killed at a rate of 
200 per day.34 
 
In a controversial meeting of the CITES Parties in Lausanne, Switzerland (COP-7) in 
1989, the decision was made to up-list the African elephant to Appendix I and thus ban 
all international trade in ivory. This caused the ivory market to plummet. The price of 
ivory fell form U$140 per pound to a mere U$5 per pound.35 However, because of 
economic strife and antagonism towards western ideals, pressure to end the ivory ban 
prevails. Some southern African countries claim that their populations have increased to 
such numbers that they have to cull some elephants in order to provide sufficient habitat 
and protection for the remaining ones.36 In recent years, much of the debate over the 
elephant has focused on the level of protection international law will extend to the 
species.37  
 
Political pressure to end the Ban has been partly successful. In 1997, at the tenth meeting 
of the CITES Parties at Harare, a few southern African countries (Namibia, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe) were allowed to trade a limited amount of ivory to Japan under strict 
controls.38 In Nairobi, at COP-11, the Ban was reinstated until an effective system was in 
place to prevent the widespread poaching of elephants.39 At COP-12, in 2002, the 
decision was made again to allow limited stockpiles of ivory to be traded from the 
southern states. Since then a ban has been put in place again and in 2005 even domestic 
                                                 
32 H Kiyono ‘Still in Business: The Ivory Trade in Asia, Seven Years after the CITES Ban’ 1997 Traffic 
International at 6, 7 
33 M Sajbel ‘The Agony and the Ivory: The Ban Hasn’t Been lifted, but some think the Rumors are enough 
to restart slaughtering. Will Ivory be Salable again?’ LA Times E1 (10 July 1997) (quoting Ginette 
Hemley, Director of International Wildlife Policy at World Wildlife Fund) 
34 Hitch (Note 10) at 172 
35 Leakey (Note 28) 
36 A J Heimert ‘How the Elephant Lost His Tusks’ (1994-1995) 104 Yale L. J. 1473 at 1473 
37 Ibid 
38 Del Baglivo (Note 11) at 300 
39 J R Berger ‘The African Elephant, Human Economics, and International Law: Bridging a Great Rift for 
East and Southern Africa’ (2000-2001) 13 Geo. Int’l. Envtl. L. Rev. 417 at 433 
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trade in ivory was banned.40 However, there remains extreme political pressure to end 
this ban and allow limited trade in those countries claiming to have healthy elephant 
populations. This pressure is led by southern African states and backed by many ivory 
market countries, such as Japan and China. On the other end of the spectrum, the east 
African countries are fighting to continue to continue to ban all trade in ivory. 
 
1.4. Research Methodology 
This paper essentially comprises a desk top study on the ivory issue. Research was 
mostly done at various libraries and research centers at the University of Cape Town 
(UCT). A common search was conducted using Hein Online, Butterworths NexisLexis, 
and the main library catalogue on the UCT Law Library Website. Once all journals, 
books and magazines containing articles relevant to the topic were located, thorough 
reading was conducted of all the relevant research material. In addition to this, key words 
such as “Ivory trade”, “Poaching”, and “CITES” were searched on Google. Here various 
news articles were collected from around the world. Various television programmes 
relevant to the topic were downloaded from the internet. The April 2006 edition of Africa 
Geographic (bought at Exclusive Books) focused primarily on the “Elephant Problem” 
and dealt with issues such as poaching and elephant management strategies. The 
magazine also included various names of people and non-governmental organizations 
which dealt with these issues. Some of the organizations were contacted and information 
was received from them, such as data reports regarding ivory seizures and number of 
elephants poached (specifically Born Free Foundation). The Environmental Investigation 
Agency provided detailed information regarding regulatory structures and the flaws 
herein (of CITES) before the Ban (pre-1989). All journal, magazine and newspaper 
articles and information from books and other sources were collected and studied. 
 
1.5. Structure of the Paper 
This paper aims at critically analyzing the recent decisions of CITES regarding the ivory 
trade. Chapter 2 will unfold the CITES structure and its provisions in force relevant to the 
control of the trade in ivory. The third chapter of the paper will discuss the history of 
                                                 
40 ‘Elephants Up and Down’ Upfront (9 July 2005) 187 New Scientist No 2507 at 7 
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CITES and the African elephant, specifically why the ivory trade flourished during the 
1980s and will also discuss the events leading up to the ban. The third chapter will 
discuss the post-ban events as well as the recent decisions made by CITES regarding the 
African elephant and its ivory. It will also describe and analyze the reasons behind, and 
implications of these decisions. The fourth chapter, the most essential part of the paper, 
will investigate the two opposing strategies adopted by African countries regarding the 
protection of their elephant populations. Sustainable Management, led by southern 
African nations; and the protection approach led by the east African nations will be 
























CHAPTER 2: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES, 1973) 
 
2.1. Background 
With the rising concern for the environment came the 1972 Stockholm United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment.41 This helped create the political context for the 
formation of CITES in 1973. The CITES Treaty was signed on March 3, 1973 after being 
drafted by the World Conservation Union (IUCN).42 It was initially ratified by only ten 
nations,43 the only African country among them being Nigeria, and it entered into force 
July 1, 1975. Today there are 142 Parties to the Convention, and it regulates around 34 
000 species of plants and animals. 
 
The CITES Secretariat is administered by UNEP and is located at Geneva, Switzerland. It 
has an essential role, fundamental to the Convention and its functions are laid down in 
Article XII of the text of the Convention. 
 
2.1. Aims and Objectives 
CITES was originally developed to meet the urgent challenge of discontinuing the loss of 
endangered plant and animal species.44 One can see the intentions of the Parties reflected 
in the Preamble of the Convention, which states: 
 ‘Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an 
irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to 
come; 
 
  Conscious of the ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic, scientific, cultural, 
recreational and economic points of view, 
 
  Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna 
and flora; 
 
                                                 
41 P Stoett ‘To trade or not to trade? The African elephant and CITES’ (1997) 52 Int’l. J. 567 at 568 
42 Hitch (Note 10) at 175 
43 Ibid 
44 Del Baglivo (Note 11) at 286 
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  Recognizing, in addition, that international co-operation is essential for the protection of certain 
species of their own wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade; 
 
  Convinced of the urgency of taking appropriate measures to this end’45 
 
CITES does not regulate the efforts of Parties to avoid habitat destruction or 
modification.46 It also does not control the killing or taking of any species.47 The 
Convention seeks to reduce the adverse effects of commercial trade on endangered and 
threatened species and ensure that the trade in other species is conducted on a sustainable 
basis.48  
 
This said, CITES is known to be one of the most successful conventions concerned with 
wildlife conservation.49 Its success is mainly due to the basic principles it sets down, 
which most states have proved willing to accept, and by the way it operates, which 
ensures that on the whole it is better enforced than many other treaties.50  
 
2.3. Structure and Purpose  
CITES regulates international trade through a permit system which is based on whether 
the species concerned is listed in either of the three Appendices to the Treaty.51 The issue 
of permits is done through a Scientific Authority and a Management Authority in each 
signatory state. Their tasks will be elaborated in the provisions quoted below. 
 
For those species in Appendix III, most of the burden for the regulation falls to the 
signatories and is voluntary.52 This section is outlined by the Convention in Article V and 
states: 
                                                 
45 CITES, Preamble (Note 27) 
46 Unlike the Convention on Biodiversity (June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818)  
47 Del Baglivo (Note 11) at 287 
48 Hitch (Note 10) at 176 
49 D M Ong ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973): Implications of 
recent developments in international and EC environmental law’ (1998) 2 B. U. Int’l. L. J. 291 at 292 
50 S Lyster International Wildlife Law Cambridge: Crotius Publications 1985 240 
51 Ong (Note 49) at 292 
52 Stoett (Note 41) at 569 
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‘1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix III shall be in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article.  
2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III from any State which has included that 
species in Appendix III shall require the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit 
shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met:  
(a) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in 
contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora; and  
 
(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so prepared 
and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.  
3. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III shall require, except in circumstances 
to which paragraph 4 of this Article applies, the prior presentation of a certificate of origin and, where the 
import is from a State which has included that species in Appendix III, an export permit.  
4. In the case of re-export, a certificate granted by the Management Authority of the State of re-export that 
the specimen was processed in that State or is being re-exported shall be accepted by the State of import as 
evidence that the provisions of the present Convention have been complied with in respect of the specimen 
concerned.’53 
Appendix II species are defined in the realm of Article II (2)(a) as ‘…all species which 
although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in 
specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation…’.54 Limited trade is allowed in 
Appendix II species, and the regulation of this trade is set out in Article IV, which states: 
‘2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior grant 
and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be granted when the following conditions 
have been met:  
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will not be detrimental to the 
survival of that species;  
(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in 
contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora; and  
                                                 
53 CITES, Article V (Note 27) 
54 CITES, Article II(2)(a) (Note 27)  
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(c) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so prepared 
and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.’  
Here it is important to note that there is no requirement to present an import permit, as 
one does for Appendix III species. This may be the reason why illegal trade in Appendix 
II species is easier. Article IV further states: 
3. A Scientific Authority in each Party shall monitor both the export permits granted by that State for 
specimens of species included in Appendix II and the actual exports of such specimens. Whenever a 
Scientific Authority determines that the export of specimens of any such species should be limited in order 
to maintain that species throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosystems in which it 
occurs and well above the level at which that species might become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I, the 
Scientific Authority shall advise the appropriate Management Authority of suitable measures to be taken to 
limit the grant of export permits for specimens of that species.  
4. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior presentation of 
either an export permit or a re-export certificate. 
5. The re-export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior grant and 
presentation of a re-export certificate. A re-export certificate shall only be granted when the following 
conditions have been met:  
(a) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that the specimen was imported into that 
State in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention; and  
 
(b) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so 
prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.  
6. The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the 
prior grant of a certificate from a Management Authority of the State of introduction. A certificate shall 
only be granted when the following conditions have been met:  
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction advises that the introduction will not be detrimental to 
the survival of the species involved; and  
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(b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that any living specimen will be so 
handled as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.’55  
The regulation of trade in Appendix II species has to some extent been criticized in the 
past,56 mainly due to the exemptions and the fact that the enforcement of the provision 
relies on the internal police powers and is subject to each country’s capabilities. The 
exemptions are set out in Article VII of the Convention. The exemptions include species 
in transit or transshipment,57 and specimens that are “personal items or household 
effects” among others.58 Exemptions like these create loopholes for traders to exploit.  
Appendix I species include all species threatened with extinction. Trade in such species 
may only be authorized in exceptional circumstances as stated in Article II(1), and not for 
primarily commercial purposes (Article III(3)(c)). Appendix I regulations are very 
stringent and strict. Export in Appendix I requires a prior grant and presentation of an 
export permit which is only supplied once four stringent conditions have been met.59 In 
order to complete a trade, an import permit, with additional restrictions, is also required. 
Trade of Appendix II, as already stated above, requires only export permits to be issued.60 
The responsibility of issuing these permits belongs to the Management Authority and 
Scientific Authority of each state. It is imperative to add that these authorities are self-
regulating and their smooth operation depends on the discretion of that country. 
The Conference of the Parties (Article XI), which take place twice a year and are usually 
well-attended, review CITES progress and discuss interpretation and operational 
problems, as well as possible changes to the lists. A proactive Secretariat (Article XII) is 
responsible for monitoring violations of CITES provisions effectively by relaying 
information on lack of implementation to the states parties concerned. Non-governmental 
organizations supply information to the CITES Secretariat to identify problems.61 
However, along with many other treaties that require states to report on their 
                                                 
55 CITES, Article IV(2-6) (Note 27) 
56 Hitch (Note 10) at 175 
57 CITES, Article VII(1) (Note 27) 
58 CITES, Article VII(2) (Note 27) 
59 Hitch (Note 10) at 175 
60 CITES, Article IV(2) (Note 27) 
61 Ong (Note 49) at 293 
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implementation of treaty obligations, CITES has experienced difficulties in respect of 
their compliance with this requirement.62 The percentage of CITES’ parties that have 
failed to submit their reports in time range between 30% and 50%, and many developing 
parties in particular have failed to do so.63                                                                       
2.4. Reservations                                                                                                                        
CITES is most probably one of the few environmental treaties that allow reservations. It 
seems that allowing a provision for reservations into an environmental treaty is going 
against the whole aim of the treaty itself. However, in CITES one can clearly see that 
many countries may not have joined without this provision.64 The provision states:                        
‘1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not be subject to general reservations. Specific 
reservations may be entered in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Articles XV and XVI. 
2. Any State may, on depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, enter a 
specific reservation with regard to:  
(a) any species included in Appendix I, II or III; or  
(b) any parts or derivatives specified in relation to a species included in Appendix III.  
3. Until a Party withdraws its reservation entered under the provisions of this Article, it shall be treated as a 
State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the particular species or parts or 
derivatives specified in such reservation.’65 
China, Japan, and even Britain entered reservations along with the southern African states 
when the African elephant was up-listed to Appendix I in 1989. This is mainly due to the 
fact that these countries were both reluctant to believe that illegal trade in ivory was 
forcing the elephant to the brink of extinction and were one of the biggest money-earners 
in this field (consumer and demand based). However, as the ivory market plummeted the 
                                                 
62 Ibid at 294 
63 M Koskenniemi ‘New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation Control and Reaction’ in J 
Werksman (ed) Greening International Institutions London: Earthscan 1996 236 at 240  
64 Zimbabwe may have withdrawn from CITES if it had not the opportunity to enter a reservation against 
the Ivory Ban. See P Mofson ‘Zimbabwe and CITES: Influencing the International Regime’ in Hutton and 
Dickinson (ed) CITES: Endangered Species Threatened Convention: The Past, Present and Future of 
CITES (London: Earthscan, 2000) 
65 CITES, Article XXIII (Note 27) 
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reservations were not all that helpful to these nations. Although reservations could benefit 
those countries choosing to enter into them, they are contradictory to the aims of the 
Convention. And as with the African elephant reservations, they often fall flat when other 
Parties abide strictly to their obligations under CITES.  
2.5. The Listing Criteria                                                                                         
Imperative to the debate about ivory sales is the Appendix listing of the African elephant. 
The language of the Treaty offers no specific guidelines for the listing of species; 
therefore, there has been an ongoing debate over the listing criteria since the first 
Conference of the Parties.66 At the first COP, the Parties adopted the Berne Criteria for 
the listing of the species. The Berne Criteria did not require the country proposing the 
listing to present specific population data to list the species. It only stated that a species 
has to be currently threatened with extinction.67 In addition, it was very difficult to 
remove the species from this list. This process caused controversy, as a Party was not 
required to present concrete biological data to list the species, but if nay party later 
wanted to remove that species from the list, or at least transfer it, biological data was 
needed.68  
In 1992, at the Eighth Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, the Parties determined 
that the Berne Criteria was inadequate and directed the Standing Committee to develop 
new criteria.69 At the Ninth Conference of the Parties, which was held in Fort Lauderdale, 
the Committee presented the new standards.70 These revised criteria represented the first 
attempt by any governing body to engage in the listing of endangered species based on 
objective, scientific criteria.71 It is, however, imperative to add that although Resolution 
9.24 states the essence of the Precautionary Principle, this provision seems largely 
                                                 
66 Hitch (Note 10) at 176 
67 S M Dansky ‘The CITES Listing Criteria: Are They “Objective” Enough to Protect the African 
Elephant?’ (1998-1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 961 at 964 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 Dansky (Note 67) at 964 
71 Ibid 
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overlooked.72 The new criteria state than in order for a species to be placed on Appendix 
I, it should meet the following criteria: 
 ‘A.  The wild population is small, and is characterized by at least one of the following: 
i) an observed, inferred or projected decline in the number of individuals or the 
area and quality of habitat; or 
ii) each sub-population being very small; or 
iii) a majority of individuals, during one or more life-history phases, being 
concentrated in one sub-population; or 
iv) large short-term fluctuations in the number of individuals; or 
v) a high vulnerability due to species’ biology or behaviour (including migration). 
 
B. The wild population has a restricted area of distribution and is characterized by at least 
one of the following: 
i) fragmentation or occurrence at very few locations; or 
ii) large fluctuations in the area of distribution or the number of sub-populations; or 
a high vulnerability due to species’ biology or behaviour (including migration); 
or 
iii) an observed, inferred or projected decrease in any of the following:  
- area of distribution; or 
- the number of sub-populations; or 
- the number of individuals; or 
- the area or quality of habitat; or 
- reproductive potential. 
 
C. A decline in the number of individuals in the wild, which has been either: 
i) observed as ongoing or as having occurred in the past (but with potential to 
resume); or 
ii) inferred or projected on the basis of any of the following: 
- a decrease in area or quality of habitat; or 
- levels or patterns of exploitation; or 
- threats from extrinsic factors such as effects of pathogens, competitors, 
parasites, predators, hybridization, introduced species and the effects of 
toxins and pollutants; or 
- decreased reproductive potential. 
 
                                                 
72 Ibid 
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D. The status of the species is such that if the species is not included in Appendix I, it is 
likely to satisfy one or more of the above criteria within a period of five years.’73 
                                    
The definition section, Annex 5, realizes the objective nature of the listing criteria. The 
section has definitions which are definitive and leave very little open for argument. 
 
The Resolution also has sections relating to when a species can be delisted. It states that 
any species currently listen in Appendix I which does not meet the criteria of Annex 1 
should be moved to Appendix II if it meets the criteria Annex 4.74 Annex 4 has an extra 
provision that states that even if a species does not meet the criteria in Annex 1 for an 
endangered species, it should not be transferred to Appendix II unless: 
 
‘a)  the species is not in demand for international trade, nor is its transfer to Appendix II  
likely to stimulate trade in, or cause enforcement problems for, any other species 
included in Appendix I; or 
b) the species is likely to be in demand for trade, but its management is such that he 
Conference of the Parties is satisfied with: 
i) implementation by range States of the requirements of the Convention, 
in particular Article IV; and 
ii) appropriate enforcement controls and compliance with the requirements 
of the Convention; or 
c) an integral part of the amendment proposal is an export quota approved by the 
Conference of the Parties, based on management measures described in the supporting 
statement of the amendment proposal, provided that effective enforcement controls are in 
place; or 
d) an integral part of the amendment proposal is an export quota approved by the 
Conference of the Parties for a specified period of time….; or 
e) a ranching proposal is submitted consistent with the applicable Resolutions of the 
Conference of the Parties and is approved.’75 
 
While the objective criteria specifically listed in the Resolution are merely “guidelines’, 
one can see that the criteria clearly require a country to present some type of data. 
                                                 
73 CITES, Ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Conf Res 9.24 
www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/eresol921.htm at Annex 1 
74 Dansky (Note 67) at 967 
75 Annex 4(B)(2)(a)-(e) (Note 73) 
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However, one can see that the provisions may be open to political and economic 
influence. After the Conference in Harare, which will be discussed in detail in a later 
Chapter, watchers began to question whether the changes made to the listing criteria at 
the Ninth Conference are truly objective. 
 
As long as the decision to list a species on Appendix I or delist a species from Appendix I 
to II is subject to a two/third majority vote at the biennial meetings of the Parties, there is 
no way to take the subjective considerations out of the listing process.76 So although the 
listing criteria may be the most objective in history, in the case of the African elephant 
there is a lot of room for improvement. When the economic, political, and social 
problems of the range states are exposed, it is easy to see how Parties allowed subjective 
considerations into the listing process.77 However, the goal of CITES was not to alleviate 
the social problems of those countries that house endangered species.78 Instead it was 
intended to protect endangered species that were being exploited by international 
commercial trade.79 Thus, if the criteria are meant to be completely objective, social 
considerations should be completely removed from the listing process. Only then will 
endangered species, like the African elephant, be adequately protected.80 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
CITES is not a general wildlife management treaty, it says nothing about protecting 
habitat and does not make killing an endangered species illegal, but it is an important 
component of a network of global and regional wildlife regimes, albeit narrowly focusing 
on the international trade aspect of wildlife protection.  An imperative consideration to 
make at this juncture relates to the utility of this Convention with respect to the 
sustainable development objective in international law generally.81 Wildlife 
conservationists have long held that the only way of securing what little we have left of 
endangered fauna and flora populations is by implementing a complete prohibition of all 
                                                 





81 Ong (Note 49) at 294 
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forms of trade in these species and their derivative products. This view clashes with that 
held by many developing governments in which these endangered species are actually 
found. These governments are of the opinion that a trade ban would be an infringement of 
their sovereign right to exploit their natural resources. However, if one investigates the 
trend in environmental treaties, many vulnerable species and ecosystems are seen as a 
“common heritage of mankind”82 and thus must be protected and not exploited. In this 
light, CITES is a protectionist treaty in species that are threatened with extinction 
(Appendix I), and a trading treaty in the sense that it allows trade in species whose 
survival is not threatened but may become so (Appendix II).83 Thus one can see how 
political pressure may influence the listing regime of CITES species. The CITES regime 



















                                                 
82 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818) 
83 Lyster (Note 50) at 240 
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CHAPTER 3: The History of CITES and the African Elephant (1979-1989) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Between 1979 and 1989 the African elephant population was completely decimated.84 
The Appendix II status of the African elephant under CITES created a requirement for 
export permits.85 This process was clearly inadequate and in 1985 the Parties adopted a 
special permit process called the Ivory Export Quota System (IEQS).86 Under the CITES 
Ivory Control System ivory could be imported only from the producer countries which 
submitted a quota to the Secretariat of CITES. The CITES Ivory Control System 
generally failed because the nations with the elephant herd ignored their ivory quotas and 
exported as much ivory as they could produce.87 Falsified export documents were 
discovered in many nations, and corrupt officials in collusion with traders found ways to 
avoid this Ivory Control System.88 
 
It was known that the elephant populations were decreasing, but many believed this was 
just a result of human encroachment on elephant habitat.89 Ivory trade was also worth a 
lot of money and many trusted that a substantial portion of this money went to the poor 
African nations. Even the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) did not support a ban and 
believed that the only way African nations would be persuaded to maintain their elephant 
populations was by the commercial use on a sustainable basis.90 CITES, during the 
1980s, was believed to be controlling trade effectively. The loopholes in the CITES 
control system were discovered during the late eighties and opened the window to the 
fact that it was the ivory trade, not habitat loss, that was causing the rapid movement 
towards extinction of the African elephant. These loopholes and other weaknesses of the 
CITES system will now be discussed. 
                                                 
84 Thornton (Note 7) 
85 CITES, Article IV (Note 27) 
86 Stoett (Note 41) at 570 
87 S Landy ‘CITES: Banning the Ivory Trade- And Attempt to save the African elephant from extinction’ 
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3.2. Weaknesses of the CITES Control System 
The CITES system of controls was so riddled with loopholes that they were easily 
circumvented by the major poached ivory syndicates.91 To mention all detailed loopholes 
would go beyond the ambit of this paper, but a few examples will be mentioned to 
strengthen the justification of the total ivory trade ban. 
 
CITES did not impose any control system over worked or carved ivory, thus poached 
ivory could fairly easily get smuggled out of Africa and taken into a non-CITES country 
such as Dubai, which had no entry restrictions, even on whole uncertified tusks. From 
there, once they were chopped up and roughly carved, it would be possible to export the 
tusks legally to many ivory trading countries in the Far-East.92 
 
When the CITES Ivory Control System came into force in 1986, several stockpiles of 
confiscated ivory had been given an amnesty and legitimized.93 One of them had been 
Burundi. This is extremely disconcerting as Burundi had no elephant populations left. 
The agreement here was that Burundi would join CITES and respect its controls.94 In 
return the Secretariat was persuaded to legalize 89 tons of illegal ivory.95 This amnesty 
would be great for Burundi as legal ivory was worth twice as much as illegal ivory.96 
Burundi sold the stockpile, did not join CITES and carried on importing poached ivory.97 
A few years later Burundi had another stockpile without permits, 90 tons of ivory and 
worth U$20 million on the legitimate market.98 The Burundi government, a new one by 
now, assured that if CITES were to legalize this stockpile they would join CITES. After 
much controversial discussion, one third of the 90 tons was legitimized. A decision on the 
remaining two thirds was deferred until the main CITES COP in 1989.99 To allow a 
                                                 
91A Thornton (ed) ‘A System of Extinction: The African Elephant Disaster’ (1989) A report handed out to 
CITES Parties at COP-7 1989 at 6 
92 Ibid at 7 
93 Thornton (Note 91) at 31 







country to continue to export ivory seemed to be actively encouraging smuggling from 
neighbouring countries.  
 
Another country with huge stockpiles of ivory (270 tons) was Singapore. This amount 
was given CITES permits in an amnesty in 1986. Traders bought some of this stockpile, 
which came with the legal paperwork. Then they had it carved in Singapore and sent it to 
Hong Kong without using the documents, because permits were not required for carved 
ivory. This left them with the Singapore permits but no ivory. Then they got raw poached 
ivory, usually from Dubai, and imported them using the spare permits.100 
 
These are just a few loopholes that traders used to weasel their way around the CITES 
controls. Consultants hired by CITES to complete reports on elephant populations and the 
ivory market were reportedly paid by traders on the side.101 Many influential people in 
Africa had vested interests in preserving poaching. Foreign diplomats would have loads 
of ivory in their luggage and claim diplomatic immunity.102 When moving ivory from e.g. 
Tanzania to Burundi, it was kept in secret chambers in trucks, and even in petrol tanks.103 
Additional stumbling blocks to conservation efforts included bribery of officials and 
funding shortages for government protection efforts.104 Bribery and corruption even made 
it as high up as government ministers.105 Eugene Lapointe, the Secretary-General of 
CITES during the eighties, even admitted to the press in May 1989 that the Ivory Control 
Unit In Lausanne had received a contribution of U$200 000 from ivory dealers in Hong 
Kong and Japan.106 
 
                                                 
100 Thornton (Note 91) at 42 
101 Ian Parker, in one of his consultant positions to CITES, worked for a major Burundi dealer to help get 
CITES to legalise 60 tons of ivory in 1986. His story provides a fascinating insight into the way that ivory 
traders and their paid agents achieved powerful influence over the CITES Secretariat. See Thornton (Note 
91) at 11 
102 In Jan 1989 the Indonesian Ambassador to Tanzania was caught with a container of poached ivory, 184 
raw tusks, 24 partly worked tusks, and 82 figurines. He claimed diplomatic immunity and when this did not 
work, he tried to bribe the customs officials. See Thornton (Note 7) 
103 Thornton (Note 7) 
104 Storey (Note 21) at 378 
105 The names of several ministers (in Zimbabwe) were mentioned in connection with elephant poaching. 
See Thornton (Note 91) at 21 
106 Thornton (Note 91) at 3 
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3.3. Towards Lausanne and the Ban on Trade in Ivory 
Growing awareness of the origins of ivory in consumer nations as well as the ever-
growing struggle against poaching in African nations caused the global outcry in support 
for the ban in all trade in ivory. Mainly due to the Environmental Investigation Agency’s 
undercover work on both the ivory market and the poaching in Africa, a proposal was put 
forward to up-list the African elephant to Appendix I. Tanzania, Kenya, Gambia, and 
Somalia were the leading countries seeking a ban on the international trade in ivory as an 
essential step towards saving Africa’s remaining elephants.107 Chad, Niger and Zambia 
also announced their support for the ban.108  
 
Some countries in southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana, 
strongly opposed a ban. These countries claimed that they had excellent management 
strategies and even had to cull their populations to keep numbers at an ecologically 
healthier level. Zimbabwe put forward their argument that they were overstocked, 
however refused to release their raw data to allow outsiders to confirm Zimbabwe’s 
estimates.109 The estimating of populations requires tremendous precision in sampling 
and extrapolations, and is a very skilled science. Publishing the raw data would have 
allowed objective statisticians to confirm Zimbabwe’s estimates if they were correct. 
Their refusal to release the figures and their insistence that despite culling their elephant 
population continued to increase seemed suspicious.110 The largest population, in the 
north-east of Zimbabwe in Hwange National Park, was claimed by Zimbabwe to have 
increased by 8 000 elephants between 1987 and 1989. But the data was based on a survey 
conducted in 1988 when thousands of elephants had migrated across the border from 
neighbouring Botswana. Sever drought had plagued its northern territory for years, and 
elephants travelled to Zimbabwe to drink form artificial watering points in the parks. 
Botswana counted its elephants in early 1989 when the migrating elephants returned to 
their territories.111  
 
                                                 
107 Unknown ‘Africanscall for end to the ivory trade’ New Scientist (10 June 1989) 122(1668) at 22 
108 Ibid 
109 Thornton (Note 7) 
110 Ibid 
111 Thornton (Note 91) at 23 
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The Government of Zimbabwe, in September 1989, made a formal request to the US 
Agency for International Development for additional funding for anti poaching because 
they claimed not to be keeping pace with the poaching.112 At the same time Zimbabwe 
was leading efforts to oppose an international trade ban in ivory. Poaching in Zimbabwe, 
however, had followed the classic patterns displayed in the north.113 Gonarezhou 
National Park had 1000 poached elephant carcasses scattered across its area in 1989, 
which made up a quarter of the whole populations.114 
 
South Africa, at this time, was reputed to be the centre of the continent’s largest illegal 
trade in ivory and rhino horn.115 Hong Kong was the distribution centre for the world’s 
poached ivory, and much of Hong Kong’s supply came through a major South African 
network made up of South African nationals and middlemen in Angola, Mozambique and 
Namibia.116 It was also testified by a respected American environmentalist, that South 
African Defence Force personnel were involved in the smuggling of ivory and rhino 
horn.117 
 
During this same time the CITES Secretariat was under suspicion due to its blatant 
opposition to the ban.118 The Secretariat was supposed to be neutral.119 Notwithstanding 
the suspicions that arose when Ian Parker, a consultant paid both by CITES and by ivory 
traders, had gone to Burundi to legalize their poached stockpile.120 Shortly after this Chris 
Huxley visited Singapore and legalized 270 tons of ivory.121 The Secretary General and a 
number of his staff were claimed to be guilty of gross incompetence regarding the control 
                                                 
112 Ibid at 21 
113 Ibid 
114 Ibid at 22 
115 Ibid at 27 
116 Thornton (Note 91) at 27 
117 Ibid 
118 Thornton (Note 91) at 3 
119 The Secretariat’s activities contravened with a resolution proposed by Canada and agreed by the Parties 
in 1985, ‘Guidelines for the Secretariat when making recommendations in accordance with Article XV’, 
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120 Thornton (Note 91) at 11 
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of the ivory trade.122 The Secretariat had attempted to dissuade major US groups from 
promoting a boycott on buying ivory; pressed for the legalization of 90 tons of poached 
ivory in Burundi; dismissed the return of these Burundi stocks to the countries of origin; 
sought agreements with the Burundi Government that part of the proceeds from the sale 
of the stock would go to the Secretariat; received substantial funding from traders who 
benefited from the 1986 Secretariat legalization of poached ivory- and continue to trade 
in ivory; and publicly opposed the Appendix I listing through public campaigning 
including TV, radio, newspaper and magazine interviews.123 These are just a few actions 
which proved the Secretariat’s contravention of its role under CITES. 
 
Eventually, at COP-7 in Lausanne, the total up-listing and ivory trade ban proposed by 
Tanzania, was rejected in favour of a proposal which sought a ban, but under special 
conditions.124 These conditions were that new criteria be developed which allowed 
countries to down-list species more easily than under the old Berne Criteria. Many of the 
southern African nations entered reservations against the Appendix I proposal of the 
African elephant. However, many countries saw the decision to up-list the African 
elephant as a hail-Mary for international environmental law. 
 
3.4. Post-Ban Events 
Since October 1989 the demand for ivory products declined dramatically.125 Elephant 
populations started to recover. For instance, in Kenya, populations grew from 16 000 in 
1989 to 26 000 in 1993.126 Although the populations of African elephants have still been 
declining, they are doing so at a much slower rate. These recoveries of population 
numbers have been welcomed by environmentalists and highly publicized.127 To western 
countries, the elephant’s comeback is proof of their governments’ commitment to the 
environment. To the African people, however, the benefit of this recovery is 
questionable. Some African states threatened to undermine the CITES ban by their intent 
                                                 
122 Ibid 
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125 The price of ivory fell form U$140 per pound to a mere U$5 per pound. See Leakey (Note 28) 
126 Storey (Note 21) at 380 
127 Ibid 
 27 
to auction their ivory stocks to Asian dealers in countries not signatory to CITES like 
Taiwan or Korea.128 And Zimbabwe and Botswana threatened to kill thousands of 
elephants in a political move apparently aimed at pressuring the world to reopen the ivory 
trade.129 
 
The ivory ban has been claimed to have been, in many ways, a quick fix.130 The long-
term problems such as resentment by humans, animal containment and habitat destruction 
caused by growing elephant populations still exist.131 Human problems such as poverty 
and hunger lead to the destruction of elephant habitat and the resistance of the African 
populations towards parks.132 Elephants are also hard to contain and often roam outside 
parks boundaries in search of food, often destroying crops and even killing people.133 
 
Many Africans view western concerns for the elephant as a colonial design to keep 
African people in poverty.134 Southern nations have continued to pressure CITES to 
lower restrictions on the ban. While many African elephants have been adequately 
protected from poachers since the ban, at the same time, ‘legal’ ivory obtained from 
culling and natural deaths have been piling up in stock rooms in countries like South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. These countries, among others, mounted a campaign to move the 
African elephant back to Appendix II so that they could once again use the species as a 
source of much needed foreign currency.135 Claiming that elephant populations must 
economically justify the allocation of land and resources necessary for their protection 
(from humans), African citizens and officials began to argue for a new ‘sustainable use’ 
strategy to manage elephant populations.136 The pressure from this campaign has 
influenced the recent CITES decisions which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: Pertinent CITES Decisions over the Last Decade 
 
4.1. COP-10 Ivory Decisions 
The tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties of CITES was held in Harare, 
Zimbabwe in June 1997. Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, opened the meeting by 
saying, “We believe a species must pay its own way to survive.”137 Three southern 
African countries, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana, proposed to transfer their 
elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II.138 The African elephant in these 
regions was claimed not to be an endangered species,139 and the CITES Panel of Experts 
announced therefore that the elephant populations of these three states no longer met the 
biological criteria for Appendix I.140 The populations did not meet the new objective 
criteria in Annex 1, and should therefore be delisted under the requirements of Annex 
4(b).141  
 
The Parties agreed to transfer these populations to Appendix II for only the following 
purposes: 
1. export of hunting trophies for non-commercial 
purposes, 
2. export of live animals to appropriate and acceptable 
destinations (Namibia-for non-commercial purposes 
only), 
3. export of hides (Zimbabwe only), and 
4. export of leather goods and ivory carvings for non-
commercial purposes only (Zimbabwe only).142\ 
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The Parties also, eventually, after much controversial discussion, agreed to allow the 
three countries to export their raw stockpiled ivory to Japan after March 19, 1999.143 This 
would only be allowed if the following nine conditions were satisfied:  
 
 ‘1. the ivory control deficiencies identified in the Panel of Experts evaluations are remedied; 
 2. the CITES Secretariat verifies that all conditions have been fulfilled; 
 3. the CITES Standing Committee agrees that all conditions are met; 
 4. the three proponent countries withdraw their reservations to the elephant listing before 
the new listing  takes effect (September 18, 1997); 
5. there is a renewed commitment to regional law enforcement cooperation through such 
mechanisms as the Lusaka agreement; 
6. mechanisms are established or strengthened to reinvest ivory trade revenue into elephant 
conservation; 
7. a mechanism is developed by the Standing Committee for automatic re-transfer of 
downlisted populations to Appendix I (i.e. halting trade) if conditions are violated or if there is an 
escalation of illegal hunting or trade; 
8. there is compliance with all other precautionary measures in the original proposals; 
9. agreement is reached on an international reporting and monitoring system for poaching 
and illegal trade.144 
 
The CITES decision required that all money the three countries would receive from the 
1999 ivory sale would go into conservation efforts.145  
 
Many countries opposed the decision, claiming that this limited opening of trade 
corridors may be detrimental to elephant populations in other African countries as 
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4.1.1. Japan as a trading partner 
Japan was chosen as a trading partner to these countries regarding the once-off sale in 
1999 for two main reasons. It is the largest consumer of ivory in the world, having 
imported the equivalent of 120 000 pairs of tusks in the ten years before the ban as 
introduced in 1989, and it is reputed to have to most effective system for regulating its 
ivory industry.147 In addition to this, finished ivory products made in Japan are intended 
solely for the Japanese market and not susceptible to export.148 The re-export of worked 
ivory to other destinations can thus be prevented, which simplifies trade monitoring and 
eliminates a potential avenue for illegal trade to develop.149  
 
However, some conservationists feel that protecting elephants by attaching an economic 
value to them and managing them commercially will only lead to further illegal trading 
system as long as a legal trading system is in place.150 Moreover, wildlife 
conservationists, such as WWF and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), agree 
that not only is there some doubt in the effectiveness of the anti-poaching measures in the 
three African countries that sponsored the proposal but also that Japan, as the world’s 
leading ivory consumer, is not a suitable trading partner.151 The success of the 
arrangement made by CITES and the countries in question depends on the assurances 
made by the Japanese authorities on their ability to track the ivory once it arrives in Japan 
and before it is processed.152 In this respect, Japan’s legislation against the illegal trade in 
ivory is acknowledged to be extremely complicated and difficult to understand.153 By 
law, all ivory sales in Japan must be registered but it appears that only whole tusks need 
to be registered and the requirements to register these tusks as being of legal origin are so 
weak to be meaningless.154 Although this internal ivory control law was enacted in 1996 
only one case went to trial in the two years after.155 Domestic regulations also stipulate 
                                                 










that all ivory products should carry a CITES tag of authorisation. In practice though, 
unscrupulous traders who sell untagged items are rarely penalised.156 Despite 
acknowledgement that the present enforcement regulations are inadequate, there are no 
plans to tighten these regulations.157 In addition to these problems, concern is expressed 
by various NGOs that there are no simple means of determining between illegally and 
legally-imported ivory once these are in the form of finished ivory products.158 Thus it 
appears that it may have been slightly premature to allow Japan to be a trading partner of 
these stockpiles. However, it may have been difficult to choose another country in the 
circumstances. 
 
4.1.2. Effects of the Ban Removal 
Some conservationists claimed that the removal of the ban had already led to increased 
poaching just months after COP-10.159 Five months before the meeting in Harare, in 
anticipation of the removal of the ban, poachers machine-gunned down hundreds of 
elephants.160 The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) reported that elephant 
poaching in Zimbabwe, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African 
Republic, Ghana and other African countries began to escalate as early as 1997, when the 
decision to allow the sale was announced.161 IFAW reported a 50% increase in elephant 
poaching in Zimbabwe alone in 1997 and 1998.162 Even a Zimbabwe newspaper claimed 
an increase in poaching activities between 1996 and 2000 with the Parks and Wildlife 
Management Authority having experienced high incidence of scourge (this was heard in 
the House of Assembly).163 Numerous studies conducted by other international NGOs 
documented increased elephant poaching and ivory smuggling across the African 
continent after the 1999 sale.164 After the approval of the sale of stockpiled ivory, a 
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significant increase in poaching was reported in Kenya’s Tsavo and Damburu wildlife 
reserves; recorded ivory seizures also increased 400% in Kenya during 1999.165 Poachers 
in Kenya’s Tsavo National Park killed 29 elephants in 1999, five times the average 
annual total during the CITES Ivory Ban.166 It is estimated that the price of ivory rose 
from $22 before the 1999 sale to approximately $400 in the year following the sale.167  
 
However, at the April 2000 Convention of the Parties in Nairobi, the CITES Standing 
Committee stated that there was no significant increase in the poaching of elephants 
attributed to the one-time sale to Japan and that the sale was a complete success in that it 
had not prompted any significant deaths on the African continent.168 So it remains 
questionable who to believe when one finds a great rift in the argument between the 
‘selling’ nations and the international NGOs. However, one might find it necessary to add 
that NGOs rarely have anything (especially monetary) to gain from their investigations. 
 
4.2. The Reinstitution of the Ivory Ban (COP-11) 
The eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties was held in 2000 in Nairobi. 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana proposed maintaining the elephant on Appendix II in 
their nations and requested further CITES-approved sales of stockpiled “legal” ivory.169 
South Africa joined the three nations in proposing further sales. Kenya and India170, 
fearful that further sales would lead to increased elephant poaching (as it did after the 
1999 sale), proposed returning the African elephant to Appendix I in all party nations, 
thereby resuming a total ban on all ivory sales.171  
 
A compromise was reached whereby the four southern African nations requesting further 
sales withdrew the proposal for two years and Kenya and India withdrew their proposal 
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to return all elephants to Appendix I.172 Parties agreed to delay any ivory sales until an 
effective system was in place to prevent the widespread poaching of elephants.173 A study 
was to be conducted on elephant population statistics and the potential impacts of future 
limited ivory trade174 the compromise agreement stayed any further discussion of 
additional ivory sales until next Convention of the Parties (COP-12) in November of 
2002.175 
 
4.3. COP-12 Decision 
At the twelfth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, held in Santiago, Chile, in 
November 2002, proposals for a further one-off trade in ivory were submitted by 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Kenya and India both 
proposed to transfer all African elephant populations to Appendix I, but later withdrew.  
 
The proposals from Zimbabwe and Zambia were rejected as these countries failed to 
prove that their management regimes were sufficient to protect their elephant populations 
from being overexploited. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa’ proposals were all 
approved but under certain conditions. The sale would only commence in 2004 and the 
selling of the stockpiles was to go to conservation efforts. The conditions which had to be 
met read as follows: 
‘a) The African elephant range States recognize: 
iii) that various funding commitments were made by donor countries and agencies to offset the loss of 
assets in the interest of unifying these States regarding the inclusion of African elephant populations in 
Appendix I; 
iv) the significance of channeling such assets from ivory into improving conservation and community-
based conservation and development programmes; 
b) Accordingly, the African elephant range States agree that all revenues from any purchase of stockpiles 
by donor countries and organizations will be deposited in and managed through conservation trust funds, 
and that: 
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i) such funds shall be managed by Boards of Trustees (such as representatives of governments, donors, the 
CITES Secretariat, etc.) set up, as appropriate, in each range State, which would direct the proceeds into 
enhanced conservation, monitoring, capacity building and local community-based programmes; and 
ii) these funds must have a positive rather than harmful influence on elephant conservation.  
c) It is understood that this decision provides for a one-off purchase for non-commercial purposes of 
government stocks declared by African elephant range States to the CITES Secretariat within the 90-day 
period before the transfer to Appendix II of certain populations of the African elephant takes effect… 
d) The African elephant range States that have not yet been able to register their ivory stocks and develop 
adequate controls over ivory stocks require priority assistance from donor countries to establish a level of 
conservation management conducive to the long-term survival of the African elephant.  
e) The African elephant range States therefore urge that this matter be acted upon urgently since any delays 
will result in illegal trade and the premature opening of ivory trade in non-proponent range States.’176  
Onlookers of the meeting claimed the debate (between the “pro-traders” and those 
countries against the opening of trade corridors) was bitterly divided, and the three 
countries had to make heavy concessions to narrowly win the two-thirds majority vote.177 
The delay of sales until monitoring can be assured was a significant breakdown from the 
original proposals to sell both the stockpiles and the annual quotas.178 South Africa’s 
Environmental Minister, Vallie Moosa, called the vote an ‘enormous victory for South 
Africa’s sustainable use policies in the international arena’.179  However, other African 
countries, like Eritrea180 were of the opposite opinion. The delegate of Eritrea claimed 
that ‘One thing….sure of is that we have sent a message around the world that the 
African elephant is less safe than it was a day ago.’181  
 
3.3.1. Implications of this decision 
In 2002, the Environmental Investigation Agency uncovered a huge poaching network 
running out of Zambia.182 Six and a half tons of ivory was intercepted on its way to 
Singapore from Zambia. When Singapore authorities opened the containers, they had 
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lifted the lid on a network which investigators believed may have transported up to 200 
tons of poached ivory, roughly the equivalent of 20 000 elephants.183 A month later 
Zambia’s proposal to sell a stockpile of ivory was rejected, for obvious reasons. 
However, this investigation in which a huge poaching network was uncovered unravels a 
suspicion of how many more networks and poaching syndicates there may be. To allow 
the three countries to sell could therefore only be done through stringent conditions. 
Reports from all over central Africa were of an increase in poaching.184 Congo’s police 
and army were accused in the involvement of rampant elephant poaching.185 One year 
after the ivory trade was relaxed, there was claimed to be a massive upsurge in 
smuggling, with China being the largest importer of illegal ivory.186  
 
4.4. The thirteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
In 2004 it became clear that Africa, rather than Asia (as in the past), had become the heart 
of illegal ivory trade.187 Much of the manufacturing was now done in Africa.188 Nigeria, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia were the main importing 
manufacturing suppliers of illegal ivory.189 Nigeria was found to be the worst regarding 
corruption and the increasing involvement in illicit ivory trade. In addition, it had the 
weakest police enforcement.190 On the 18th March 2004, CITES banned all domestic 
trade in ivory. The decision to allow a once-off sale (at COP-12) of stockpiled ivory from 
the three southern African states was put off.191 Trade was considered not to be safe while 
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It remains unclear what the future decisions of CITES will be regarding the limited trade 
in ivory. It is, however, very clear that illegal trade increases with legal trade, and many 
African countries suffer when these trade corridors are opened. As far as the stockpiles 
waiting to be sold by the three African nations who received the go-ahead in 2002 are 
concerned, the Secretariat of CITES claims that the network CITES set up in 1998 to 
monitor poaching and elephant demographics has not yet gathered enough statistics 
through the reporting systems of the nations involved.192 Kenya also claimed that South 
Africa had failed to prove that none of its stockpiled tusks came from poaching, and that 
very few African states are supplying up-to-date mortality data for elephants, which 
CITES would need to spot upsurges in poaching.193 With a rising illegal domestic trade in 
ivory in countries so close to the southern states requesting to sell stocks (Angola and 
Mozambique are heavily involved)194  it seems that it will be a while before this sale will 
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CHAPTER 5: Sustainable use versus Protection 
 
5.1. Introduction 
It was at the seventh meeting of Conference of the Parties in Lausanne in 1989 when it 
became clear that a clear rift in attitude and ideals was forming between the east African 
nations and the southern African nations regarding the protection of the African elephant. 
Two primary theories of wildlife management have developed. Pure protectionism, lead 
by east African countries like Kenya, appose any trade in ivory.195 Advocates of 
sustainable use, lead by southern countries like Zimbabwe, applaud the decision to allow 
ivory sales to continue.196 Competition for land between people and elephants is severe in 
these countries. As both these countries encourage that wildlife is also found outside 
parks, this often causes tension as the overpopulation of people creates more habitat loss 
for elephants. As elephants are forced to now live in the vicinity of humans, it becomes 
obvious that dangerous encounters will occur. After the ivory ban, both countries turned 
their attention to human needs while forming and implementing their elephant 
management strategies.197 Tourism remains more vital than ever in both Zimbabwe and 
Kenya’s economies.198 However, while Kenya has gained much financial revenue from 
tourism and remains a popular tourism destinations, Zimbabwe’s recent political strife 
and increased costs of travelling has rendered is almost “dangerous” to visit. The Kenyan 
authorities have long opposed both hunting and culling, while both are supported in 
Zimbabwe.199 While most of the wildlife is under state control in Kenya, a significant 
proportion of Zimbabwe’s wildlife has been transferred to District Councils. The idea 
here is that the people living on the land must reap the benefits of the wildlife found on 
that particular piece of land. Wildlife is in turn viewed as a resource. In Kenya wildlife is 
protected and only dangerous animals are eliminated. Both these ideals will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
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5.2. Protection Approach led by Kenya 
Kenya, along with some of the other east African countries, took the brunt of the ivory 
trade. Poaching almost decimated elephant populations in these areas. Anti-poaching 
units lost their lives defending elephant herds from poachers. These countries lobbied so 
strongly for the ban because their elephants were literally on the brink of extinction. The 
ivory trade was responsible for this.  
 
Protectionism derived from the practical impossibility inherent in distinguishing illegal 
ivory from legal ivory.200 Its Proponents reasoned that the more legal ivory traded, the 
easier it will be for poachers to place illegal ivory into the trade stream.201 This is 
reflected in the events preceding the Ivory Ban. Kenyan President, Daniel Arap Moi, 
publicly set fire to 2 500 tusks, in an attempt to create awareness that selling ivory 
represents the murder of elephants. Rather than focus on the sale of ivory for income, 
Kenya has developed a very robust tourism industry.202 Wildlife tourism in Africa 
provides more than $4 billion annually to urban and rural communities, reflecting 
tourists’ desire to see elephants and other African wildlife in their natural habitats.203 The 
method used to eliminate human-elephant confrontations is fencing areas containing 
elephants. 
 
5.2.1. Separating humans and elephants through fencing 
Richard Leakey maintains that the only way to keep the conflict between humans and 
elephants at bay is to fence the elephants away from human habitations.204 Fencing is 
relatively easy to construct, does not directly harm elephants, helps keep poachers out, 
and has political support.205 The electrical fences are designed to keep large avifauna 
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inside but allow other animals to move across the borders and roam in “non-park” 
territories.206  
 
However, elephants are highly nomadic and often travel long distances in search of food 
and water. An inability to disperse can lead to the sort of deforestation experienced in 
Kenyan parks.207 Artificial boundaries cause inbreeding and is a negatively affects natural 
selection. The only way around this would be to allow parks to be constructed along 
“ecological boundaries” or let elephants roam from one park to another. The latter of this 
is undesirable as it creates tension between humans and elephants. Conservationists from 
southern African states claim that enclosed elephants will multiply and destroy their own 
habitat, killing themselves and other species. However, one would think natural species 
would reach a carrying capacity capable by the area the elephants are enclosed in.  
 
5.2.2. Killing dangerous animals 
It is inevitable that elephants will become dangerous when in contact with humans. In the 
first four years after the ivory ban 108 people were killed by elephants in Kenya.208 This 
caused and uproar among local communities such as the Masai Mara. KWS Director 
Richard Leakey authorised the killing of dangerous elephants in 1990.209 Almost 200 
elephants were killed by field wardens from 1990 to 1994 in response to angry citizens. 
After an accusation that KWS cared more for elephants than it did for humans, more 
aggressive policy towards killing dangerous elephants was developed.210 
 
While problem animal control usually involves killing one or a few dangerous animals, 
culling for ecological purposes requires the killing of large family groups, and the 
practice has not been supported by Kenya.211 While KWS is eager to kill dangerous 
elephants before they harm cause harm, it has always been opposed to culling. The reason 
for this will be discussed in a later section. 
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5.3. Sustainable Use led by Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is the leader in putting conservation in the hands of rural communities and 
tribes rather than leaving this responsibility to the state.212 Its vision of sustainable use is 
based on consumptive use.213 Zimbabwe’s approach to elephant management is vastly 
different to Kenya’s. While Kenya allows only the killing of dangerous animals, 
Zimbabwe actively culls herds, promotes hunting, and lobbies for the legalization of the 
ivory trade.  Conservationists here argue that efforts to protect elephants, can, and should, 
be funded through trade in elephant products.214 Zimbabwe along with the other southern 
states argues that they have managed their populations more successfully than the eastern 
countries and therefore should not be penalised.215 The southern states also argue that 
effective elephant management is expensive, and that the sale in ivory, taken from culling 
and natural deaths, can aid them in conserving the elephant for future generations.216 
However, in the past, the monetary benefits from selling ivory have rarely gone back into 
the protection of the elephant.217  
 
Many Parties, along with the east African nations, disagree with the southern states’ 
argument that sustainable use is the only way to save the elephant from extinction. India, 
a range state of the Asian elephant, fears that any legalized trade in elephant parts will 
lead to the “dirty ivory” scenario in which approved ivory auctions include ivory taken by 
poachers in Asia as well as Africa.218 Other countries, like the United States of America, 
believe that approved ivory sales will once again push the elephant to the brink of 
extinction.219 
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The southern states view these objections to their plans for sustainable use of the elephant 
as interference of their sovereign right to use their natural resources as they see fit.220 
They see this interference as an example of neo-colonialism, where Western states and 
international NGO’s meddle in their plans in an attempt to keep their countries in 
poverty.221 
 
5.3.1. Culling as a management objective 
Zimbabwe, along with South Africa, is one of the few countries that use culling. This is 
done for the following reasons; to reduce numbers of elephants down to maintain 
maximum diversity, and to bring in revenue for the parks.222 The latter, they claim, is 
necessary as elephants are capable of causing the localised extinction of animals and can 
damage the vegetation.  
 
Other countries, such as Kenya, strongly oppose culling as morally wrong.223 Richard 
Leakey, former Director of Wildlife in Kenya, says: “There is plenty of evidence that 
elephants are intelligent, social animals. Can we morally justify killing these creatures? I 
think not.”224 Cynthia Moss, a well-known elephant researcher, agrees.225 She has spent 
decades with the elephants in Ambolesi Park in Kenya, documenting familial interactions 
and responses to death, and this has given her a strong feeling of opposition towards 
culling.226 
 
Most officials and conservationists agree that elephant populations in Zimbabwe are not 
currently endangered.227 Elephant populations are claimed to be rising and officials claim 
there are too many elephants for the habitat allocated to them.228 Despite international 
scepticism, southern African states have been culling for years with no significant 
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pressure from outside groups. Culling seems an acceptable solution for Zimbabwe in the 
short term, and many of its ecologists accept is as an unhappy necessity.229  
 
Culling is popular with the local populations because they benefit directly or indirectly 
from the cull. In addition to this, local communities have resentment toward elephants 
and are happy to have them killed.230 In the long term, however, as more is known about 
the elephant, culling may become increasingly under fire.231 Until then the nations that 
use culling will increase their pressure on the international community to allow a return 
to ivory trading.232 
 
5.3.2. CAMPFIRE 
The Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) 
was launched in Zimbabwe in 1989.233 The program puts the responsibility of 
conservation into the hands of local communities. The idea here is that if the 
communities will financially benefit from the wildlife in their area they will be more 
inclined to use it sustain ably. Revenue is earned through the sale of hunting permits.234 
This money is then injected back into the community to build schools and roads, among 
other things.235 
 
The launch of CAMPFIRE was to decrease the communities’ hostility to elephant 
preservation by turning the elephant into income.236 Under CAMPFIRE, local 
governments are given control over, and profit from, natural resources as an incentive to 
maintain them.237 Profits can come from various sources, such as eco-tourism and photo-
safaris. However, the main source of income comes from hunting.  
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Campfire’s immediate roots trace back to Rhodesia’s 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act, which 
first allowed area landowners to use wildlife.238 In 1999, twenty-seven of the fifty-six 
communal areas utilized CAMPFIRE.239 It is hard to say now, after the country has had 
much political turmoil in recent years, how much influence CAMPFIRE still has.  
 
CAMPFIRE is able to utilize trophy hunting as a source of revenue because CITES only 
prohibits the trade of elephant products.240 Hunting for sport is not regulated by CITES. 
The cost of a hunt is high, and an elephant can bring around U$ 10 000.241 By engaging 
people in the management of their own environment, CAMPFIRE has provided new 
economic and ecological stability. Most important to Campfire’s success is the fact that 
many communities have seen a greater return from utilizing wildlife than through other 
land uses.242 
 
CAMPFIRE has been seen in much positive light regarding the elephant. However, it has 
been criticised because of its reliance on hunting as well as its inability to become self-
sufficient.243 The program has been funded since its inception by donor nations.244 
Through USAID, the United States has pledged over U$28 million to CAMPFIRE for 
operating years 1996-1999.245  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
In considering the next step, the CITES Parties should consider what the elephant 
management approaches in the east African countries (Kenya) and the southern African 
countries (Zimbabwe) have in common, instead of dwelling on the differences.246 
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In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, competition for land between elephants and humans is 
high. Both wildlife authorities in both countries want to keep wildlife alive on lands 
outside parks and reserves. Both wildlife authorities, while acknowledging failures and 
problems, are proud of their history of responsible management of wilderness areas.247 It 
is important to remember that both countries claim to promote the survival of the species. 
Zimbabwe, however, sees the survival of the elephant viable only if it can bring in 
profits. 
 
While Kenya opposes the hunting and culling of wildlife, Zimbabwe supports it. In 
Kenya the national government retains most control over wildlife, while in Zimbabwe 
wildlife is predominantly owned by District Councils.248  
 
Kenya opposes the ivory trade and claims that as long as African governments are corrupt 
there will be an opening for illegal trade when legal ivory trade is allowed. The approach 
led by Kenya stems from frustration over corruption, greed and ‘unsustainable 
sustainability’. It has been proven in the past that advocates of sustainable use, such as 
Zimbabwe, have claimed that poaching is no problem- while poaching in 1989 was just 
as problematic as in Kenya- and that they should be allowed to continue trading in ivory.  
 
Zimbabwe argues that it has a sovereign right to exploit its resources as long as it is done 
sustain ably. There are arguments to this and the sustainability principle regarding the 
protection of elephants. First, its program, CAMPFIRE, has failed to become self-
sufficient. Second, the opening of trade corridors, as Zimbabwe is proposing, would 
almost certainly lead to the overexploitation of elephants across the African continent, 
albeit not in Zimbabwe.  
 
Both management schemes are, in principle, excellent. However, in practice they are 
problematic, as funds are never sufficient and corruption is inevitable. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1. Conclusion  
CITES is the embodiment of international environmental law regulating trade in 
endangered and threatened species.249 The Convention also represents the frontline in the 
war to protect animals and plants from extinction due to unsustainable use and 
exploitation by man.250 Founded on the Principles of Preservation, Precaution, and 
Common Concern for Humankind, the Convention places the protection of species in the 
range states. One of Zimbabwe’s CITES delegates wrote, in answering a questionnaire in 
1992, that there are no monetary benefits from joining CITES.251 It seems that some 
states have forgotten the purpose of environmental treaties like CITES. Countries all over 
the world came together for once not in their own interests, but in the interests in the 
survival of species other than human beings. Once all countries realize that this is the 
purpose and that preserving species like the elephants for purposes of both moral 
obligation and even human survival in some cases, then only can a treaty like CITES 
operate successfully. 
 
The 1989 Ivory Ban stands as a model for international action to save an endangered 
species facing extinction.252 In imposing the Ban, the Parties refused to allow theories of 
national sovereignty and subsidiarity to prevent unified action in order to save the 
elephant from extinction.253 Southern African states, however, reject this view of the 
Ivory Ban and have since pressured CITES to reopen trade corridors. This pressure has 
been partly successful. However, due to the limited sales of ivory in 1999, illegal trade 
increased. This in turn has affected decisions made by CITES to put a ban in place again 
in 2004. This ban will not last long, and pressure is continuing to mount to reopen trade 
in ivory.  
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In theory, limited trade in African elephant ivory is possible and even advantageous for 
the states facing overpopulation in African elephants. However, in practice, the 
management controls on the supply side in Africa and the demand side in Japan are 
insufficient to prevent poaching and the eventual decimation of the species.254 The 
sustainable use system used by Zimbabwe will be an eventuality that all countries will 
have to employ in the long-term. Sustainable development is, after all, the goal of all 
human development concerning the environment. In the case of the protection of the 
elephant, however, it is necessary to include our moral obligations. Buck de Vries of the 
Gwayi Conservancy in Zimbabwe once said: 
 
 ‘We want the elephant to be a commodity, because if it isn’t it might as well be 
dead.’255  
 
This embodies the point of sustainability. However, there must be a move towards a less 
anthropogenic way of thinking. After all, humans may be the most successful members of 
all living beings, but our intelligence should teach us that sharing the world instead of 
exploiting it for our own economic benefit may bring more in the way of fulfilment than 
any artificial gain we may get from all other species.  
 
6.2. Recommendations 
Unless the elephant is to be subjected to the same horror it faced in the 1980s, a number 
of steps must be taken. First, the ivory trade must not continue until both the supply side 
and the demand side are dried up. In other words, as the President of Kenya, Daniel Arap 
Moi put it, “To stop the poacher, the trader must be stopped and to stop the trader, the 
final buyer must be convinced not to buy ivory.”256 States that do not comply with the 
international ban must be pressured to do so until the elephant (all over Africa) is safe 
and an international controlled ivory-marketing system is in place.257 It will take time for 
the monitoring systems (like MIKE and ETIS) to gather enough information in order to 
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gain control over elephant numbers, poaching syndicates and the ivory market. It is 
important to mention here that the latest technology should be used when operating the 
ivory-market system. Recent advances in science and forensics have been impressive.258 
International control through the use of tagging technology should be implemented. 
 
Domestic enforcement is also weak in range countries and corruption among law 
enforcement authorities is not unknown. Antipoaching squads and other enforcement 
units need to be strengthened.259 This can only be done if funds for these efforts are 
increased. Here, as Western nations adamantly claim that the protection of the African 
elephant is crucial, as well as that species like the elephants are a ‘common heritage of 
mankind’, developing nations struggling for conservation funds should be guided and 
funded by wealthier Western nations.260 Here funds should also be allocated to public 
awareness and education so that the resentment many rural people feel towards the 
elephant can be changed, albeit slowly, towards the understanding of the need to protect 
species like the elephant.  
 
Ultimately, environmental sustainable development must be supported as an essential 
prerequisite to elephant protection.261 The elephant will not be safe as long as unlawful 
conduct pays more than lawful conduct. Most people believe that development is directed 
at the preservation and enrichment of human life.262 Thus sustainable economic growth 
will be, in the long-term, the elephant’s best insurance, particularly growth that gives the 
local populace a stake in the elephant’s survival.263 Until public awareness campaigns can 
teach people otherwise, it is an unhappy eventuality that the only way to protect a species 
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